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Even as the threat of international conflict between great powers re-emerges, violent civil 
conflict remains one of the greatest threats to human security and global stability. 
Persistent conflicts – those that have been active for twenty years or more – resulted in 65 
million forcibly displaced persons worldwide at the end of 2017.	 This record high is an 
increase of 20 percent from the previous year. In Africa alone, more than 35 such conflicts 
continue to pose the utmost challenge for conflict resolution despite investments of over a 
trillion dollars in peacebuilding and foreign aid by the international community. The 
spread of extremist threats through conflicts across the Middle East and Africa—e.g., 
Syria, Iraq, Sudan, Yemen, Somalia, and the Democratic Republic of Congo–demonstrate 
that ignoring these conflicts is not an option. Creating the right balance and coordination 
among security assistance, military peace operations, humanitarian relief aid, and long-
term peacebuilding remains an elusive goal.   
 
Are these intervention failures due to unsuitable policies and practices, to the fundamental 
intractability of the conflicts, or some combination of both? This question is the subject of 
many academic and policy studies. However, most studies of when, where, and how to 
intervene are limited in perspective, and fail to assess the combined effects of different 
types of interventions on human security over time.   
 
Practitioners and policy makers recognize that lifting social and political systems out of the 
“conflict trap” requires a systems approach. Such an approach holistically considers the 
nature and context of the conflict, in conjunction with the scope, timing, and dynamic 
interactions among different modes and types of interventions. Using twenty-five years of 
comparative data on persistent conflicts in Africa, supplemented by a case study of 
Somalia, this brief presents a scalable systems framework to (1) examine the relationship 
between conflict persistence and factors associated with conflict contexts, peacekeeping 
and aid interventions, and (2) identify the underlying  principles and practices for those 
conflict interventions most likely to result in conflict transformation that increases human 
security, and those most likely to sustain conflict.   
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Key findings  
 
(1) Violence in persistent armed conflicts in Africa over the past 25 years display one of four 
types of archetypal system behaviors (Figure 1): Exponential Growth; Sustained 
Oscillations; repeated episodes of Overshoot-and-Collapse; or Damped Impulse (an 
intense but limited stimulus followed by gradual decline). These behaviors scale from 
local to state level. From a systems 
perspective, each behavior is 
characteristic of different underlying 
structural conditions in combination with 
resources within the system.  Once 
established, the behavioral dynamics 
become self-reinforcing and may dictate 
the likelihood of conflict persistence or 
transformation through interventions.    
 
(2) Security and aid interventions interact at local levels to reinforce conflict structures and 
capacities. In so doing, they become endogenous to the conflict and contribute to the 
resilience of combatants. Conflict transformation must account for, and interrupt, these 
dependencies. For example, humanitarian aid delivery in conflict settings often requires 
security measures to protect aid workers and prevent cooptation of aid by combatants. 
Unintended consequences can be that  
a. The local economy becomes dependent on the conflict-driven demand for security 
measures. The creation of “security-entrepreneurs” among local populaces by the 
aid community has been a repeated programming challenge for NGOs and 
peacekeeping operations alike in East Africa.   
b. Competing “war lords” are created to oversee aid distribution. Empowerment of 
rival warlords in Somalia, Liberia, and the Democratic Republic of Congo to help 
with UN aid delivery significantly increased the intensity and duration of violence 
in those conflicts.  
c. Communities become isolated and 
vulnerable in humanitarian deserts 
in the wake of limited 
peacemaking operations that may 
drive combatants out, but not 
away. The combatants profit by 
imposing road taxes (“zaqat”) 
where they control access of aid 
workers to the communities. This 
is a common practice by Al 
Shabaab in Somalia and various 
combatants in Syria (Figure 2). 
 
(3) The prospect of conflict transformation depends strongly on two endogenous factors— 
opportunity costs of conflict and gender equality, in combination with processes by 
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conflict transformation is highest when accompanied by gender empowerment and 
implemented through transparent, inclusive mechanisms at the local level that provide 
accountability, that scale from local to national levels, and that ensure coordination 
between security and humanitarian operations. Absent such process mechanisms, the 
resources provided through interventions are more likely to prolong conflict and human 
suffering than provide pathways for transformation. 
 
These findings show that expectations of interventions in persistent conflicts must be tempered 
by realities of the conflict setting and appropriately resourced and managed (not too much nor 
too little). Delivery of security and aid interventions must be coordinated and employ 
mechanisms that are inclusive, transparent, and accountable at the local level. Moreover, conflict 
transformation cannot occur without structural changes to break cycles of dependency on conflict 
resources. In short, intervention failures have as much to do with how they are implemented as 
what they are.  
	
 
Conflict Persistence: The Case of Somalia 
 
Somalia epitomizes the complex ways in which interventions interact with endogenous 
conditions to affect conflict persistence and provides a case study of how different approaches 
affect conflict behaviors. In 1991, the central government of Somalia collapsed with the ousting 
of Mohamed Siad Barre, triggering a civil war that has lasted for more than 25 years. Since that 
time, the international community has alternated between intervening with humanitarian aid, 
ignoring the conflict, and deploying different diplomatic, military intervention, peacekeeping, 
and development initiatives. These interventions have included multi-dimensional, UN-approved 
international relief efforts; sanctions and diplomatic mediation; unilateral, military campaigns of 
neighboring countries; regional peacemaking missions; and infusions of development aid. Each 
intervention phase has been accompanied by different patterns of violence and structural shifts, 
resulting in lessons learned for aid, development, and peace-keeping communities (Figure 3). 
 
As clan-based warlords fought for 
political control in Somalia following 
Barre’s fall, a massive, famine-driven 
humanitarian crisis necessitated 
intervention by the international 
community to provide secure delivery 
of relief aid in 1993. Unwilling and 
unable to conduct such operations 
alone, the United  
Nations (UN) requested help from an 
international coalition led by the 
United States, the Unified Task Force 
(UNITAF). At the time, U.S. 
Ambassador Robert Oakley and the U.S. 
Joint Chiefs of Staff argued that since 
humanitarian, political and security goals were so interdependent, an integrated policy between 
Figure	3	Intervention	and	Conflict	Events	in	Somalia,	1989-2017	
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the United States and the UN must be established. Progress had to occur concurrently along a 
three-track strategy in support of these goals. Without a stable government, functioning police 
forces, and long-term economic aid, Somalia would slide back toward disaster, they maintained.  
 
UNITAF fulfilled its humanitarian task in securing the delivery of aid, saving the lives of 
hundreds of thousands of Somalis,1 but when the United States and UN pulled out of Somalia in 
1995, the political and security mandates of the UNSOM I and UNSOM II peace operations were 
left unfulfilled. Security steadily eroded and political reconstruction was stillborn, with warlords 
continuing to build private militia and consolidate power, inviting military interventions by 
neighboring Ethiopia and Kenya.  Al Shabaab’s subsequent emergence as an alternative for 
justice and self-determination now threatens the region and the world, contained only by efforts 
of the international community through the African Union Mission in Somalia (AMISOM) and 
UN peacekeeping efforts, augmented by U.S. and European Union (EU) military support.  
Oakley’s predictions of disaster without integrated intervention strategies proved correct. 
 
The shadows cast by these dynamics are long, dark, and costly. When the fragile Federal 
Government of Somalia (FGS) was re-established in 2012, more than $7 billion of development 
and humanitarian aid had been expended by the international community, and over two million 
persons (almost 1/3 of the Somali population) had been displaced. More than 20,000 civilians 
had been indiscriminately killed by combatants, while severe famines had caused the deaths of 
more than 500,000.  
 
In May 2015, U.S. Secretary of State John Kerry visited Mogadishu with great fanfare to meet 
with a consortium of international diplomats and International Non-Governmental Organizations 
(INGOs); commanders of the world’s largest military peacekeeping force, AMISOM;2 and 
leaders of the struggling FGS to support new hopes for political stability, security, and economic 
development in this ravaged country. These hopes were to culminate in free and fair elections in 
2016, supported by the international community. February 8, 2017 marked an important 
milestone, as, after several delays due to continuing violence and instability, Somali Members of 
Parliament gathered in a high-security hanger at the Mogadishu airport to elect Mohamed 
Abdullahi Farmaajo the second president of the FGS in a peaceful transition of power from his 
predecessor.  
 
While significant, this political progress is fragile, threatened by the resilience of Al Shabaab and 
warring clans, the continued presence of external interventions, and ongoing drought and food 
insecurity.  Even as the international community optimistically predicted successful conflict 
transformation in Somalia in the spring of 2017,3 over the course of the year more than one 
million persons were newly displaced due to drought,4 hundreds of civilians were killed by 
																																																						
1 At the height of Operation Restore Hope, over 30,000 troops deployed to provide security to UN humanitarian relief workers in 
the face of hostility by armed bandits and in fighting among clans.  
2 AMISOM currently deploys over 22,000 military troops, 386 police officers, and has trained over 4000 Somalia police officers. 
3 “International support for Somalia must focus on rebuilding security, averting famine”, UN News Center, 11May 2017.   
http://www.un.org/apps/news/story.asp?NewsID=56729. Accessed February 7, 2018 
4 IOM Somalia Humanitarian Response – 2017 Annual Report, International Organization for Migration, Feb 9, 2018.  
https://reliefweb.int/report/somalia/iom-somalia-humanitarian-response-2017-annual-report. Accessed Feb 9, 2018.  
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bombings carried out in and around the capital city of Mogadishu,5 while U.S. airstrikes more 
than doubled from previous years, incurring civilian as well as combatant deaths.6 For the first 
time in five years, pirates hijacked a large tanker off the northern Somali coast. Even with the 
political progress, infusion of humanitarian aid totaling over $1B USD in 2017, and continued 
AMISOM presence of 22,000 troops, there were 5,800 direct conflict-related fatalities in 
Somalia in 2017, and an estimated 6.2 million persons (40 percent of the population) are in dire 
need of humanitarian assistance.7 Clearly, human security and conflict transformation remain 





Headline crises in Syria, Iraq, Yemen, Afghanistan, Ethiopia, and the Democratic Republic of 
Congo, —as well as ongoing events in Sudan, Nigeria, India, Columbia, and Myanmar, to name 
a few—show that trajectories of armed civil conflict that persist despite substantial international 
intervention are not unique to Somalia. Hard-won peace in conflicts thought to have been 
resolved with help of the international community—from Mozambique in the south of Africa to 
Burundi in the Central Great Lakes region, to the Ivory Coast and Sierra Leone in West Africa—
is currently threatened. Over the past two decades, even as the overall number of new civil 
conflicts has decreased, conflict restarts and persistence have been rising.  These conflicts differ 
in causes and combatants, but they pose similar challenges for appropriately balancing security 
assistance, peace operations, humanitarian relief aid, and long-term stabilization efforts. 
 
Some argue that these challenges are intractable, and that a “hands-off” approach by the 
international community is required. Such arguments are short-sighted and result in unacceptable 
costs in terms of human suffering, regional instability, and threats to global security interests.  
These conflicts ravage the countries in which they occur, creating a normative mandate to relieve 
human suffering. In addition to the immediate effects of death by violence, disease, and 
starvation, the conflict traps they create exact huge long-term costs to human security, and the 
state economies and governing institutions upon which human security depends. The World 
Bank estimates that lost productivity, failure of state institutions, capital flight, and increased 
military spending, reduces average incomes at the end of civil wars by 15 percent less than they 
would have been otherwise, driving people into extreme poverty and deprivation. The 
devastating effects spill over into surrounding regions through displacements, disease, and illegal 
trade, causing regional instabilities and suffering (Figure 4). These conditions give rise to new 
global threats that require expensive interventions (military, peacekeeping, and humanitarian) to 
protect national security interests.  
																																																						
5 “Bombings in Mogadishu – a 2017 timeline”, Al Jazeera, October 22, 2017, 
http://www.aljazeera.com/indepth/interactive/2017/10/attacks-somalia-timeline-171021144546962.html.  Accessed Feb 7, 2018. 
6“Somali citizens count cost of surge in US airstrikes under Trump”, The Guardian, January 23, 2018, 
https://www.theguardian.com/world/2018/jan/23/somali-citizens-count-cost-of-surge-in-us-airstrikes-under-trump. Accessed 
February 7, 2018; “Pentagon Foresees at Least Two More Years of Combat in Somalia”, New York Times, December 10, 2017. 
https://www.nytimes.com/2017/12/10/world/africa/pentagon-somalia-combat-islamic-
militants.html?rref=collection%2Ftimestopic%2FSomalia&action=click&contentCollection=world&region=stream&module=str
eam_unit&version=latest&contentPlacement=4&pgtype=collection .  Accessed February 7, 2018. 	
7 “Somalia – Complex Emergency”, USAID Fact Sheet #1, Fiscal Year 2018, February 9, 2018. 
https://www.usaid.gov/sites/default/files/documents/1866/somalia_ce_fs01_02-09-2018.pdf. Accessed February 22, 2018 





Policy Responses: Intervention Approaches in Civil Conflicts 
 
Most responses to civil conflict are predicated on the model of a “conflict trap”, wherein civil 
wars weaken state economies and governing institutions, increase human insecurity, and create 
leaders and organizations vested in violence, creating positive feedback loops for conflict risk 
(Figure 5). Low-income countries without effective development policies or governance 
institutions to respond to and manage grievances are at most risk. Absent external interventions, 
these traps are self-reinforcing. Security and aid interventions (humanitarian and development) 
aim to break reinforcing cycles by strengthening economies and governance institutions while 
reducing human insecurity (Figure 6).  
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Military interventions in civil conflict have become the most likely use of armed force involving 
both major powers and less powerful states for the last several decades. External interventions 
involving coalitions of the willing, regional peacekeepers, and international peace operations 
increased tenfold from an average of less than two per year during the Cold War to an average of 
more than 20 per year since 2000. These interventions have entailed both Chapter VI and VII 
UN peacekeeping missions and peace enforcement missions, comprised of military coalitions of 
the willing and/or regional organizations acting under UN authorization or recognition (Figure 
7).8 They involve increasing numbers of troop contributing countries (TCCs), with the average 
rising dramatically from just under fifty TCCs per year in 1990 to over 120 TCCs per year in 
2014. At the same time, aid from the international community to conflict-affected countries has 
been rising steadily, with approximately $50 billion USD in aid going to countries with recurring 
conflicts in 2014. Of this, approximately 50 percent is in the form of humanitarian relief. 
 
Key challenges are knowing when to intervene, and with what amount of resources. Intervention 
strategies using foreign humanitarian and development aid are more effective at different phases 
during and after conflict.  In recent years, a consensus has developed within the academic and 
practitioner literature on conflict, peacekeeping, and humanitarian aid that the ideal scenario for 
breaking the conflict trap involves security measures early on (e.g., external military peace 
enforcement, peacekeepers, and police) to reduce violence between belligerents and protect 
citizens, followed by a buildup of humanitarian aid and development programs, conditional upon 
reform of government institutions. Theoretically, this sequencing reduces the likelihood that 
fungible aid will be diverted to support combatants and increases the likelihood that it will be 
distributed for the public good. However, the ideal sequence is rarely followed in practice, as 
new humanitarian crises and conflict entrepreneurs often interrupt policy plans, creating 
demands for earlier-than-ideal introduction of aid and/or imbalanced security measures. 
																																																						
8	UN troops deployed under Chapter VI are involved in monitoring and peacekeeping activities such as protecting civilians, 
assisting in the disarmament, demobilization and reintegration of former combatants; protecting human rights, assisting in 
elections and restoring the rule of law and extending legitimate state authority. Chapter VII authorizes armed responses to acts of 
aggression and breaches of peace through the use of air, sea, or land forces as may be necessary to maintain or restore 
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Moreover, the approach may require two decades or more to significantly reduce the risk of 
recurring violent conflict, making comparative evaluation of effectiveness difficult. 
 
 
Scorecard for Intervention Approaches  
 
Meaningful assessment of intervention outcomes is difficult for several reasons. First, cohesive 
and coordinated strategies between security and aid interventions are the exception rather than 
the rule, creating conflating factors due to interactive affects. Second, long time periods (10 – 20 
years minimum) and multiple scales (local, subnational, national, and regional) are required to 
rigorously assess and compare impacts of different types of interventions on conflict risk 
reduction.  However, consistent longitudinal data does not exist for most interventions and types. 
What data does exist is most often reported only at the national level, and is rarely geo-
referenced.9 Thirdly, direction of causality of outcomes is difficult to attribute, as higher-level 
interventions are most often associated with more intense and complex conflicts.  Finally, every 
conflict contexts is somewhat unique. However, in recent years, sufficient evidence has 
accumulated derive the following conclusions about intervention outcomes from the academic 
and policy literature.  
 
Military interventions: Quantitative data analysis of armed civil conflict consistently shows that 
changes in the balance of power brought about by external, non-neutral armed military 
interventions lead to increased violence against citizens, and most often result in longer conflict 
duration, regardless of the setting or type of civil conflict. 
 
Peace Operations: Limited evidence shows that types of peace operations in civil conflict matter. 
Specifically,  
• The presence of uniformed UN peacekeeping troops reduces the level of hostilities and 
may support enduring peace, independent of the type of conflict. However, the conflict 
durations are usually longer; 
• The presence of UN observers alone is associated with increased hostility;  
• Prior to 2008, the presence of non-UN uniformed peacekeeping troops did not have a 
significant effect on successful peacebuilding.  
These outcomes for peace operations are explained in the literature through the lenses of the 
security dilemma, instrumental logic of violence, and bargaining models. Frequently cited levers 
for affecting outcomes are the relative capacity of the intervening troops, and perceived 
neutrality.  
 
Foreign Aid:  Overall, foreign aid has a poor record for improving overall human security in 
conflict settings. Specifically,  
 
• Humanitarian aid in conflict settings where security is low (and hence where the aid is 
often most needed) increases the risk of conflict and likelihood of violence against 
citizens;  
																																																						
9 Projects by AidData.org to geo-reference aid disbursement at the subnational level in Africa and Asia are helpful 
but to date have been limited and constrained by the lack of granularity in data reporting. 
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• Increased development aid in conflict settings, as well as foreign aid shocks (e.g., severe 
decreases in aid revenues), tends to increase the likelihood of violence against citizens; 
• Improving social and institutional capacities through technical development assistance is 
most effective in early post-conflict stages; development aid to shape elite interests is 
only effective if delivered at least 4 years post-conflict. Earlier financial interventions 
give rise to the high risk of conflict recurrence.  
 
Explanations most often cited in the literature for the dismal outcomes of foreign aid assistance 
are greed and corruption, opportunity exploitation, exclusionary practices, learned dependence, 
and binding constraints combined with lack of donor capacity and/or over enthusiastic donors.  
 
 
Shifts in Intervention Approaches 
 
Four shifts in intervention policies have occurred in recent years, some of which are in response 
to the above results. The first is an increased emphasis on development assistance as a means of 
conflict prevention. The second is increasing the use of Non-Governmental Organizations 
(NGOs) as the vehicles for aid delivery in conflict settings, with an emphasis on building 
absorptive capacity at local levels, working through civil society organizations. The third is 
donor emphasis on local community priorities and resilience for aid programming in conflict 
settings, and less on state-level metrics of development. Finally, multidimensional peace 
operations are increasingly deployed in active conflicts, including those that involve regional 
organizations (such as the European Union or the African Union) and coalitions (such as the 
Economic Community of West African States, or ECOWAS) for peace enforcement activities as 
precursors to UN peacekeeping operations. (Figure 8). 
  
The U.S. shift to emphasize development assistance over security assistance began in the early 
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civil war, and more on belief in the democratic peace theory, combined with perceptions of 
reduced national security threats as communist regimes were challenged in former Soviet Union 
countries. Allocations by the US Agency for International Development (USAID) to democracy 
and governance initiatives targeting developing countries grew from $121 million to $722 
million per year from 1990 to 2003. This trend was amplified after 9/11 when foreign aid 
became a key weapon in the U.S. global war on terror. Global trends in aid to conflict-affected 
countries mirror those of the United States (Figure 9).  
 
The shift towards local civil society NGOs as implementing partners in aid delivery increases the 
salience of the aid and reduces opportunities for government corruption and co-optation of these 
resources. However, an unintended consequence is decreased transparency and accountability, as 
these funds are extremely difficult to quantify and impossible to track, making it hard to fully 
account for funds and to assess the extent to which donors and international actors are working in 
partnership with local actors. Lack of transparency, in turn, creates problems for appropriately 
sequencing and coordinating security and aid interventions, makes coordination with peace 
operations difficult, and creates divisions among humanitarian actors and between humanitarian 
actors and peacekeepers. These divisions are routinely exploited by belligerents to reduce 
intervention effectiveness, gain access to resources, and perpetuate conflict. 
 
 
Innovation Need: A Systems Approach that Works 
 
Donor organizations for both security and aid interventions—e.g., U.S. Department of Defense 
(USDOD), European Union Military Commission (EUMC), the World Bank, USAID, UN 
Security Council (UNSC), and the UN Development Program (UNDP)—recognize the 
interdependencies between aid and security interventions in civil conflict, and that policy and 
operational coordination between peace operations and economic assistance through 
humanitarian and development aid is a key factor in the success of failure of peacebuilding 
strategies. They find that interactive effects are especially important to consider when resources 
that start out as exogenous factors (e.g., those introduced through peacekeepers, humanitarian 
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based approaches to doctrine and operations in conflict settings.10  However, as noted during a 
UN debate in 2014 on improving conflict prevention measures, such approaches are often at risk 
of being “little more than a thematic vision.”11   
 
The remainder of this brief describes an innovative, concrete approach for analysis and design of 
conflict interventions from a systems perspective. The approach, based on dynamics of complex 
adaptive systems, provides new insights on correlations between system-level behaviors and 
conflict persistence; the dependence of system behaviors (and, by association, conflict 
persistence) on conflict context, intervention pathways and capacities; and interactive effects 
between conflict factors and interventions.  
 
 
System Reference Behaviors, Dominant Structures, and Conflict Dynamics 
 
A fundamental concept of dynamic systems is that of reference behaviors. The premise is that 
there are a limited number of archetypal patterns for how system variables interact and change 
over time to result in system states of equilibrium, instability, or resilience. Basic reference 
behaviors introduced earlier in Figure 2 are Exponential Growth (or Decay), Overshoot and 
Collapse, Sustained Oscillations, and Damped Impulse.  A variation of these is S-shaped growth, 
which results from exponential growth that becomes limited by the constraints on capacities 
within the system.  
 
Reference behaviors result from underlying system structures characterized by feedback loops 
between stocks (e.g., accumulations of capacities) and flows (e.g., rates of capacity usage)—and 
time delays within those feedback loops. Stocks are the “memory” of a dynamic system and are 
the sources of its disequilibrium and dynamic behavior when compared to goals and 
expectations. Examples of stocks are Gross Domestic Product (GDP), food supplies, refugees, 
human security, violence.  Examples of flows are GPP per capita, annual aid distribution, 
displacements, death rates, and recruitment.  
 
																																																						
10 For example, the US Army Counterinsurgency Field Manual 3-24 published in 2006 calls for explicit consideration of 
interactions between peacekeeping, stabilization, and kinetic operations while prioritizing the security of citizens to defeat 
insurgents.  In her foreword to the field manual, former US Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense Sarah Sewall calls this 
systems’ approach a “radical departure” from previous military doctrine.  The EUMC also adopted a systems approach in its 
revised Concept for Military Planning of 2008, which calls for the integrated use of a wide range of tools across “institutions and 
policy areas that comprise political, diplomatic, economic, humanitarian, and military actions.” Similarly, in adopting Resolution 
2171, which pledges a systems approach to conflict prevention, the UNSC recognized in 2014 that early warning, preventive 
diplomacy, mediation, deployment, peacekeeping, disarmament and peacebuilding are “interdependent, complementary and non-
sequential” The World Development Report of 2011 focuses on the interconnections between security, humanitarian relief, and 
development interventions.  The report notes that failure to address the security of citizens, justice, access to resources, and 
economic development with a systems approach results in repeated cycles of violence in fragile states, and makes specific 
recommendations for layered approaches across multiple levels. Taking up this theme in 2012, the US AID hosted a summit on 
“Strengthening Country Systems” to explore ways to apply systems approaches being piloted by the Agency to the problems of 
aid effectiveness. More recently, UNDP Administrator Helen Clark highlighted the need for systems approaches in her speech at 
the High-Level Panel on Humanitarian Financing, July 14, 2015, “Building a New Vision to Address Long-term and Recurrent 
Humanitarian Crisis”.  
11 Remarks made by Carolyn Schwalger, Deputy Permanent Representative of New Zealand at the 7247th meeting of the United 
Nations Security Council, “Speakers in All-Day Debate Cite Early Warning, Mediation, Cooperation with Regional 
Organizations as Effective Tools,” UN Meetings Coverage and Press Releases, SC/11528, 21 August 2014.  
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Each feedback loop in a system is a closed chain of causal influences that drive stocks and flows, 
and that constitutes a unit of analysis for the system.  Complex systems contain multiple, 
interacting feedback loops that may be either balancing or amplifying with respect to the stocks 
they contain.  Relationships between these feedback loops, their relative strengths, and the delays 
between them determine the reference behaviors of stocks and the overall system state of 
equilibrium or disequilibrium. 
 
Systems dominated by feedback loops with capacity limitations or limited goal-attainment 
generate overall balancing behavior. Overshoot and Collapse and Sustained Oscillations are two 
such behaviors leading to different system states due to capacity limits or delayed responses to 
competing goals. Two examples of the former are (i) the violence of Hutus against Tutsis’ in the 
1994 Rwanda genocide that resulted in the collapse Hutu power; and (ii) the stalemate of 
combatants in the Second Liberian Civil war which led to Peace Deal in 2003 brought about 
through nonviolent means in large part by the joint Muslim-Christian Women’s Peace 
movement. Examples of the latter are the ongoing ethnic clashes in Ethiopia and Kenya. Systems 
in which dominant feedback loops are goal-seeking with unconstrained capacity result in 
amplifying behavior characterized by Exponential Growth. Besides Somalia, examples include 
the Democratic Republic of Congo, Sudan, and Nigeria, although the resources for relatively 
unconstrained conflict growth differ in each of these cases. Damped Impulse results from 
attenuated response to a sudden, one-time increase of flow into a stock with a delayed response. 
Examples include the Angolan civil war triggered 1976, leading to a massive infusion of 
weapons from both the Soviet Union and US to arm both sides, and the more recent insurgency  
in Mali triggered by flood of arms from Libya after 2012.  
 
Applying these theoretical concepts to the general problem of civil conflict persistence, one can 
expect high risk of conflict persistence when underlying structures lead to exponential and 
oscillatory reference behaviors, and increased likelihood of conflict transformation in the case of 
overshoot and collapse.  Conflict deterrence, rather than transformation, results from Damped 
Impulse. A theoretical mapping between conflict risk factors and interventions, causal 
mechanisms for conflict persistence, dominant system structure, and expected impact on system 
reference behavior is shown in Table 1.    
 
The conflict risk factors and theoretical mechanisms in the two left-hand columns of Table 1 are 
drawn from the conflict literature. The dominant system structures and expected reference 
behaviors (two right-hand columns in Table 1) are derived from the literature on complex system 
dynamics.  The mapping between the two sides of the table was developed and mapped as part of 
this research and discussed below. The expected reference behavior for each in the right-hand 
column. The mapping in Table 1 was qualitatively tested, through triangulated data that includes 
over 100 field interviews on the Somali conflict, case study literature on conflicts in Africa, and 
analysis of media and donor reporting.  Interviews were conducted with representatives of donor 
organizations (USAID, UN organizations, EU, African Union, INGOs and local NGOs); local 
scholars and government advisors; civil society actors; peacekeeping soldiers (AMISOM); aid 
recipients and refugees. The interviews took place in Kenya, Ethiopia, Burundi, Uganda, 
Geneva, and Washington DC over the course of three months during the summer of 2015.   
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Theoretical Mechanisms Dominant System Structure  Expected Reference 
Behavior 
Commodity exports Higher rentier income 
increases greed, differentially 
affects capacities 
Positive reinforcing loops with 
delayed resource constraints  
Exponential (weak 
constraints) or Oscillatory 
(strong constraints) 
Low GDP per capita  Equally affects capacities, 
low opportunity costs 
Delayed balancing loops 
create strong reinforcing loop 
Exponential with eventual 
saturation 
Low GDP per capita and 
high inequality 
Grievance and low 
opportunity cost 
Goal-driven with delayed 
resource constraints  
Exponential (weak balancing 
loops) or Oscillatory (strong 
balancing loops) 
Availability of illicit 
income  





Type of conflict: coups All or nothing Goal-oriented with resource 
constraint, no delays 
Overshoot & Collapse 
Type of conflict: ethnic 
“sons of soil” 
Hold out for accommodation 
& negotiation 
Goal-oriented with delayed 










Social fragmentation Low state reach, competing 
goals of inter-ethnic rivalries 




Number of belligerent 
groups 
Diluted state capacity, 
competing goals and 
resources 
Capacity constraints, 
competitive goal-seeking  




Increase relative capacities 
and expectations 
Change strength of balancing 
loops and delays 
Episodic Damped Impulse 
(on side of government) or 
Exponential (against 
government) 
Military victory Increased post-conflict 
violence, corruption, 
uncertainty 
Goal seeking with asymmetric 
capabilities, no delay 
(competitive pay-off) 
Episodic Overshoot & 
Collapse 
Negotiated settlement Capacity limited commitment 
problems; security dilemma; 
gender empowerment 
Delayed capacity limited goal-
seeking on all sides (mutual 
accommodation);  
Oscillatory 
Peace operations post 
conflict 
Increase commitment 
capacity and transparency, 
human security, reduce 
corruption 
Reduce delays and goal-
seeking gap 
Damped Impulse, Oscillatory 
with lower amplitudes and 
mean 
Peace operations during 
conflict 
Reduce expectations of, cost 
of coordination, security 
dilemma 
Reduce delays and goal-
seeking gap 
Damped Impulse, Oscillatory 
with lower amplitudes and 
mean 
Foreign Aid during 
conflict 
Aid as benefit: Increase state 
capacity; reduce grievances 
Goal-seeking with reduced 
delays and increased capacity 
Overshoot & Collapse, 
Oscillatory with lower 
amplitudes and mean 
Foreign Aid during 
conflict 
Aid as harm: Corruption, 
rent-seeking, capture, increase 
grievances 
Increase asymmetric capacity, 
goal-gap within balancing 
loops; increase goal-seeking 
Exponential 
Foreign Aid post conflict Improve social capacity 
through technical assistance 
Increase governance balancing 
loop 
Overshoot and collapse 
Foreign Aid post conflict Increase elite power through 
financial assistance 
Create competitive goal-
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Comparative Analysis of Conflict Persistence and Intervention Policies 
 
Using the annual count of violent conflict events as the measure of system state for reference 
behavior, thirty-four persistent conflicts active in Africa from 1989-2014 exhibit one of four 
reference behaviors. These conflicts are listed in Tables 2-3, grouped according to the mode of 
reference behavior. In Tables 2-3, Group A consists of conflicts exhibiting overshoot and 
collapse; Group B consists of conflicts exhibiting damped impulse; Group C consists of conflicts 
exhibiting exponential growth; and Group D consists of conflicts exhibiting oscillatory behavior 
 






























Burundi A 170 7.3 1.3 -5.6 8.6 3.1 501[18.5] 53 36
Chad A 475 8.9 6 33 22 1.97 2161[14.1] 108 44
Liberia A 200 2.9 5.1 -0.8 48 1.59 7.71[3.6] 79 36
Namibia A 3087 1.9 4.2 -4.4 34 35.5 1911[9.7] 336 61.3
Rwanda A 332 8.5 5.2 1.3 16 6.43 671[13.3] 64 50
South1Africa A 4590 44.4 2.5 0.07 58 71.3 33801[4.8] 467 62
Average'A 1475.7 12.3 4.1 3.9 31.1 20.0 650[10.7] 184.5 48.2
Angola B 1922 15.1 5.8 46 34 31.3 16701[10] 361 49
Congo-Brazzaville B 1581 3.3 3 54 50 27.5 1561[8.3] 308 51
Guinea B 417 9.1 3.4 -2.6 32 16.8 78.21[10.7] 93 42
Guinea-Bissau B 350 1.3 2.5 -3.3 38 53.7 8.41[9.7] 78 43
Lesotho B 617 1.9 4.2 8.8 20 9.46 331[6.8] 55 56
Mali B 382 12 4.6 -5 30 15.1 78.2[16.7] 105 42
Sierra1Leone B 308 4.7 2.6 -15.5 41 8.79 28.41[8.2] 84 37
Average'B 796.7 6.8 3.7 11.8 35.0 23.2 293.2[8.6] 154.9 45.7
Bukina1Faso C 379 12.5 5.5 -4.4 19.8 8.7 75.21[8.2] 87.7 45
Cameroon C 900 16.8 2.2 7.2 46.5 41.4 2141[7.9] 225 43
DRC C 249 52.2 0.8 2.6 36 . 2471[8.7] 55 43
Gabon C 6302 1.3 2.9 39 77 39.8 1361[6.1] 1701 42
Mauritania C 670 2.9 3.6 -5.7 50 14.9 59.21[.] 173 40
Mozambique C 295 19.1 6.5 -7.2 29 9.51 79.31[9.7] 57 45.7
Nigeria1(BH) C 850 129 5.8 33 37 44.9 8171[3] 161 46
Somalia C 195 7.8 0.4 -1 34 25.8 307[3]* . .
Sudan C 903 29.4 3.8 10.2 32 25.7 10701[21] 234 35
Average'C 1193.7 30.1 3.5 8.2 40.1 26.3 333[8.5] 336.7 42.5
Algeria D 2713 24 2.8 19.7 50 97.1 38971[10] 505 35.3
CAR1 D 279 37 1.1 -7.1 38 6.15 20.31[9] 49 53
Ethiopia1 D 273 68.9 6 -5 15 15.2 4781[15] 95 33.6
Ivory1Coast D 952 16.1 2.1 2.5 45 48.9 2441[12.2] 218 41
Kenya1(Kik) D 576 32.7 3.5 -8.9 21 16.1 3751[6.8] 110 47
Niger D 258 12.4 3.3 0.9 16.5 7.4 35.61[5.7] 80 38
Nigeria1(P) D 850 129 5.8 33 37 44.9 8171[3] 161 46
Senegal D 736 10.5 3.5 0.001 36 16.1 1261[6.1] 167 43
Uganda D 332 25.9 6.8 -4.9 12.7 10 2241[12.5] 78 43
Zimbabwe D 608 12.6 5.9 -3.4 33 33 2201[10.2] . 42
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Table 3 Summary Metadata of Conflict Interventions12 
 
 
In Table 3, peace operations involving uniformed personnel are measured in terms of mission 




12 Data on Aid from AidData.org; data on peace operations compiled from multiple sources including UN, EU, AU, mission 
websites and Military Balance reports.  Data for CPIA from World Bank.  
 Economic data from Somalia estimated from The Economist. 
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Multinomial regression analyses using system reference behavior as the dependent variable 
provide insights to the following policy questions concerning interventions in persistent conflict:   
 
How do external interventions affect risk of conflict persistence, compared to endogenous 
conflict risk factors?   
 
Endogenous conflict risk factors, absent consideration of interventions, have strong explanatory 
power for differentiating among observed reference behaviors of conflict, with security and aid 
interventions reinforcing but not fundamentally changing the dynamics generated by endogenous 
conditions. Mechanisms associated with state capacity and reach, governance, cooperation 
mechanisms, opportunity costs, and social cohesion are the most robust predictors of reference 
behaviors. 
 
Specifically, compared to a baseline outcome of Sustained Oscillatory behavior,  
 
• Overshoot and Collapse leading to conflict transformation is more likely with higher levels 
of gender equality, which is known to support enhanced cooperation mechanisms in conflict 
resolution; higher opportunity costs, as indicated by depth of poverty; presence of border 
wars; and higher levels of state reach as measured by state security forces per km2.  It is less 
likely with higher levels of state capacity as indicated by GDP per capita, high dependence 
on oil rents, and larger populations.  
• Damped Impulse, which temporarily suppresses conflict, is more likely with higher levels of 
state capacity as indicated by military expenditures as percent of GDP; state reach as 
measured by percent urban population; border wars; and gender equality. It is less likely with 
larger populations and numbers of belligerents.  
• Exponential Growth is most likely when opportunity costs, indicated by male youth 
unemployment, are low; state reach, indicated by higher numbers of belligerents and percent 
urban population, is low; governance as measured by Polity IV is poor; and there is lack of 
social cohesion, indicated by higher ethnic polarization and social fragmentation.  It is less 
likely when both state capacity, as indicated by GDP per capita, and state reach, as measured 
by state security forces per km2, are high.  
 
Are levels of and types of interventions correlated with patterns of conflict persistence?  If 
so, what types of interventions are most likely to result in conflict transformation? How do 
aid and security interventions interact to affect long term risk of conflict persistence? 
 
All else being equal, compared to Sustained Oscillatory behavior,  
 
• Higher levels of aid (both development and humanitarian) are positively correlated with 
Exponential Growth, Damped Impulse, and Overshoot and Collapse. Higher levels of 
total aid as a percent of GDP are most strongly correlated with Overshoot and Collapse.  
• Higher levels of UN troops for peace operations are positively correlated with 
Exponential Growth, Damped Impulse, and Overshoot and Collapse.   
• Higher levels of regional troops for peace operations are negatively correlated with 
Overshoot and Collapse, and positively correlated with Exponential Growth and Damped 
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Impulse. Coalition troop presence is also negatively correlated with Overshoot and 
Collapse.  
 
These results, which are robust to model permutations, suggest that  
 
• Persistent conflict characterized by Sustained Oscillatory reference behavior, where the 
system is in a state of semi-equilibrium with resilient but constrained actors on both 
sides, is most likely in the absence of interventions.  Endogenous factors that create stable 
balancing constraints—and hence a quasi-equilibrium system state of conflict 
resilience—are higher state capacity13 combined with low state reach, low opportunity 
costs combined with low social cohesion within a large population. Absent fundamental 
structural changes or system shocks, these conflicts may persist indefinitely (e.g., Kenya). 
• Conflict transformation opportunities in the aftermath of Overshoot and Collapse are 
most likely when both opportunity costs of conflict and gender equality are high; and 
when higher levels of development aid are combined with the presence of UN peace 
operations, but not coalition or regional peace operations (e.g., Rwanda). Where state 
capacity is higher due to oil resources and/or larger populations, the likelihood of conflict 
transformation is reduced, regardless of interventions (e.g., Nigeria).  
• Higher levels of humanitarian aid and security interventions through regional or coalition 
forces are equally likely to result in either Damped Impulse or Exponential Growth. A 
key differentiating factor appears to be the relationship between state capacity and state 
reach. When these are high, Damped Impulse behavior is more likely, regardless of the 
interventions (e.g., Angola).  When state capacity and reach are low, Exponential Growth 
is more likely, and interventions tend to amplify the exponential behavior (e.g., Somalia). 
All else being equal, large populations and higher numbers of belligerents reduce 
effective state capacity and reach, and thus increase the likelihood of conflict persistence.  
 
Accounting for Scale Effects  
 
The comparative analysis of system-level reference behaviors in these 34 conflicts is based on 
macro-level measures of endogenous factors and interventions. However, most conflict events 
and transformative mechanisms occur at the micro level.  Micro-level, geo-located data on 
conflict events in Somalia reveal that the same reference behaviors are present at the district 
levels. While these can be generally associated with different intervention trends over time, geo-
located aid and security data, as well as economic, demographic, and governance data, are 
insufficient for quantitative correlation tests at the micro-level of the same type as conducted at 
the macro level.  Qualitative narratives from structured field interviews corroborate the 
associations between amplifying mechanisms for exponential conflict behavior due to aid and 
security interventions, and confirm the transformative effect of gender empowerment on local 
level conflicts.  
 
																																																						
13 State capacity consists of both military capacity and governance capacity.  Military capacity concerns the state’s ability to deter 
or repel challenges to its authority through force.  Indicators of military capacity include size of security forces relative to the 
populace and military spending.  Governance capacity concerns the state ability to provide services for the populace and to 
accommodate grievances through institutionalized channels.  Three different aspects of governance capacity are bureaucratic 
efficiency, resources, and dependence on patrimonialism.  
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Policy implications and recommendations 
 
The approach presented in this brief provides an operationalized systems-level framework for 
concretely assessing how contextual factors in conflict, aid and security interventions interact to 
affect conflict persistence in the long-term, and implications for policy.  Specific findings are 
that  
 
(1) Persistent civil conflicts exhibit archetypal reference behaviors characteristic of complex 
adaptive systems. The behaviors are dependent on endogenous system level capacities for 
conflict, cooperation, and governance, and the amplifying and balancing feedback 
structures through which these operate. 
(2) Interventions that fail to change structural factors or relative capacities that determine 
dominant, systems-level feedback mechanisms are likely to reinforce, rather than 
transform, existing conflict patterns.  
 
One of the most robust and striking findings is the strong correlation between system behavior 
that supports conflict transformation and the degree of gender equality. This correlation is 
different than—and independent of—factors for corruption, polity, or institutional capacity. The 
interpretation that gender equality may be a proxy for cooperative behavior and conflict 
management skills is reinforced by the qualitative analysis in the Somalia case study, and is 
consistent with experiences of the international communities engaged in peace and security, as 
well as the development fields. This finding presents an important challenge and mandate to 
bridge the policy agendas across these communities to strengthen the role of women in 
peacebuilding while ensuring their security at the same time.  
 
A second and related policy implication is that to effectively transform conflict, interventions 
must change underlying structures. However, both the peacekeeping and humanitarian aid 
communities rely on normative and operational principles of neutrality, which are usually 
contradictory to objectives of structural change and rarely achievable to the ideal desired. 
Transparent and inclusive mechanisms to balance competing interests in how aid and security 
interventions are implemented at the local levels are minimum requirements to resolve this 
dilemma.   
 
Transparency mechanisms in regional organizations, as exemplified by AMISOM, are minimal 
to non-existent. For example, data for troop deployments within specific areas of operation 
below the administrative level over time are not only inaccessible to the public, but they are 
often not even known to commanding officers of the different AMISOM units. Even more 
problematic are unclear communications regarding the reality of security situations on the 
ground, as peace operations attempt to gain the critical confidence of local communities 
necessary for prevailing in counterinsurgency operations, and addressing lessons learned from 
peacekeeping failures to protect civilians. Transparency in regional peacekeeping operations and 
command structures in Africa, their relationships to domestic security capacities, and 
transformation pathways for stabilization operations are all necessary and achievable policy 
goals requiring a combination of political will, cultural adjustments, and prudence, and supported 
by infrastructure investments for sustainability. 
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Transparency within the aid community active in conflict settings also varies widely. Reporting 
mechanisms for official development assistance by government donors and major INGOs are 
robust and increasingly accessible to the public for monitoring, research, and policy planning. 
However, these mechanisms lack transparency beyond the first level of donors and providers, 
who increasingly push funds down to lower levels through civil society NGOs and other 
domestic actors. These funds are extremely difficult to quantify and impossible to track, making 
it extremely difficult to fully account for funds and to assess the extent to which donors and 
international actors are working in partnership with local actors. 
 
Transparency in security assistance provided by donors is as important as transparency within 
receiving organizations for getting this ratio right. Current U.S. policies for building partner 
capacity through security sector assistance programs lack sufficient transparency mechanisms for 
monitoring and accountability, despite a proliferation of oversight committees, as exemplified 
with current situations in Yemen, Syria, and Iraq. 
 
Increased local ownership, inclusivity and participation of all sectors of society (elders, youth, 
women, and civil society) is a mantra found in almost every research study and set of policy 
recommendations for interventions in conflict settings, grounded in solid research and field 
experiences, and instantiated as an international policy norm in the UN Security Resolution 1325 
reaffirming the full participation of women in conflict resolution and peacebuilding. Inclusive 
processes are credited with conflict transformation in Burundi, Rwanda, Liberia, and Somalia at 
both the local and national levels. In contrast, lack of inclusivity is a characteristic of persistent 
conflict, and a major contributor to mass atrocities and the rise of violent extremism. 
Exclusionary policies, however, continue to plague many peacebuilding efforts, especially with 
respect to disarmament and reconciliation of armed groups in conflicts. 
  
Finally, local polities must be empowered to hold accountable those who receive benefits from 
external interventions. Ultimately, this requires a shift from the principle that those in power 
control the resources to one that provides for inclusive, local-level participatory decision 
processes regarding resource distributions. In the highly-militarized societies that characterize 
persistent conflict settings, this shift is difficult to say the least, and is at the heart of conflict 
transformation goals. Often, there are few formal institutions with capacities to provide such 
accountability, nor are they necessarily the best path in cultures ripe with corruption. In these 
cases, informal institutions and civil society groups with local level buy-in are preferable 
vehicles for accountability and can borrow strategies from both successful grassroots 
peacebuilding activities and playbooks of nonviolent activities. Security sector reform is key to 
whether such informal institutions and civil society groups can be effective accountability 
mechanisms. Successful security sector reform, in turn, has been found to depend critically on 
the participation of civil society.  
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